TH E WH ITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:

JOHN G. ROBERTS~

SUBJEC'l' :

Department of Justice Recommendations
on Creation of an Intercircuit Tribunal

Jonathan Rose has transmitted for your consideration the
conclusions of the Department of Justice with respect to the
Chief Justice's proposal to create an intercircuit tribunal
between the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Shortly after the Chief Justice announced his proposal the
Attorney General formed a committee within the Department,
chaired by Paul Bator and composed of most of the Assistant
Attorneys General, to formulate a Department position. The
committee has now completed its \vork, and issued a ten-page
report.
In a marked departure from previous Department positions on
national court of appeals proposals, the committee
recommended that the Department support creation of a
temporary (five year) intercircuit tribunal to hear cases
referred by the Supreme~Court. The decisions of the
tribunal would be nationally binding, subject to further
review by the Supreme Court. The committee proposed that
the tribunal be composed of 7 or 9 court of appeals judges,
rather than, as currently proposed in the pending bills,
shifting panels of 5 or 7 drawn from a pool of 28 court of
appeals judges. The committee also recommended that the
Chief Justice select the judges to sit on the new court,
subject to approval by the Supreme Court. The current bills
provide for selection of the judges by Circuit Councils.
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds
dissented from the committee report and filed a statement
detailing his reservations.
As I explained in my February 10 memorandum to you on this
subject, I think creation of a new intercircuit tribunal is
exceedingly ill-advised. Nothing in the Department of
Justice committee report dissuades me from this view. The
President we serve has long campaigned against government
bureaucracy and the excessive role of the federal courts,
and yet the Department committee would have his Administration support creation of an additional bureaucratic
structure to permit the federal courts to do more than they
already do. What is particularly offensive from the unique

-2perspective of our office is the committee recommendation
that judges be appointed to the new tribunal in a manner
that not only constitutes an unprecedented infringement on
the President's appointment powers, but ,.,ould go far in
undermining the significance of our prior judicial
appointments.
The basic reason given by the committee to support creation
of an intercircuit tribunal is the excessive workload on the
Supreme Court. While some of the tales of woe emanating
from the Court are enough to bring tears to the eyes, it is
true that only Supreme Court Justices and schoolchildren are
expected to and do take the entire summer off.
Even assuming
that the Justices have reached the limit of their capacity,
it strikes me as misguided to take action to permit them to
do more. There are practical limits on the capacity of the
Justices, and those limits are a significant check preventing
the Court from usurping even more of the prerogatives of the
other branches. The generally-accepted notion that the
Court can only hear roughly 150 cases each term gives the
same sense of reassurance as the adjournment of the Court in
July, when we know that the Constitution is safe for the
summer. Creating a tribunal to relieve the Court of some
cases -- with the result that the Court will have the
opportunity to fill the gap with new cases -- augments the
power of the judicial branch, ineluctably at the expense of
the executive branch.
In this respect it is highly significant to note that the committee conceded that the executive
branch is not adversely affected by the Court's workload:
"The Department has a high success rate with its petitions
for certiorari; and no Division reports substantial dissatisfaction with its ability to get conflicts resolved."
It is also far from certain that the proposed tribunal will
in fact reduce the workload of the Court. As noted above,
it seems probable (to me, at least) that if the new tribunal
relieves the Court of 40 cases, the Court's eventual response
will be to take 40 new cases it otherwise would not have to
fill the void.
Even aside from this, the new scheme will
increase the workload by (1) making initial review of a
petition more complicated and time-consuming, since a new
option -- referral to the tribunal -- must be considered;
(2) requiring review of the decisions of the new tribunal;
and (3) increasing filings as lawyers perceive increased
opportunities for review after decision by the Court of
Appeals.
In his memorandum to you, Rose states that "Only
actual experience with such a tribunal can take the arguments for and against an enlarged appellate capacity at the
national level out of the realm of conjecture and provide a

-3concrete evidentiary basis for assessing this approach."
This is total abdication of reason, tantamount
to arguing that the only way to determine if a bridge can
hold a lO-ton truck is to drive one across it. And the
critical assumption -- that this is only a five-year experiment -- strikes me as unfounded.
Once the tribunal becomes
a part of the federal judicial bureaucracy there will be no
chance to abolish it, particularly if, as I strongly suspect,
the Supreme Court promptly fills its caseload to capacity
even with the aid of the tribunal.
The most objectionable aspect of the committee's report is
its recommendation that the Chief Justice select the members
of the new court, subject to approval by the Supreme Court.
The power of the tribunal -- to reverse Courts of Appeals
and provide nationally-binding legal interpretations -- is
significantly different from the power currently exercised
by sitting Court of Appeals judges. When those judges were
appointed and confirmed it was not envisioned that they
would exercise such power. The proposal would create
essentially new and powerful judicial positions, and the
President should not willingly yield authority to appoint
the members of what would become the Nation's second most
powerful court. The "precedents" cited by the committee -appointment of district judges to sit on circuit courts, and
selection of members of specialized judicial panels -strike me as qualitatively different from the proposal under
consideration. Such "precedents" do not, in any event,
explain why we should sacrifice the Constitutionally-based
appointment power of the President.
Further, requiring approval of the Supreme Court for appointments ensures that the new tribunal will be either bland or
polarized, depending on whether the Court splits the seats
(a Bork for Rehnquist, a Skelly Wright for Marshal) or
proceeds by consensus (I cannot immediately think of an
example agreeable to both Rehnquist and Marshal).
In either
case the new court will assuredly not represent the President's judicial philosophy -- and will have the authority to
reverse decisions from courts to which the President has
been able to make several appointments that do reflect his
judicial philosophy . . under the committee proposal a carter-1
appointed judge (there definitely will have to be some on
the new court) could write a nationally-binding opinion
reversing an opinion by Bork, Winter, Posner, or Scalia -- _
something that cannot happen now.
The Justice Department must soon respond to inquiries from
the Senate subcommittee considering the pertinent bills, and
Rose accordingly would appreciate "a prompt White House
response." I await your guidance on what type of response
to prepare.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:

JOHN G. ROBERTS 9~

SUBJECT:

Chief Justice's Proposals

The Chief Justice devoted his Annual Report on the State of
the Judiciary to the problem of the case load of the Supreme
Court, a problem highlighted by several of the Justices over
the course of last year. The Chief Justice proposed two
steps to address and redress this problem: creation of "an
independent Congressionally authorized body appointed by the
three Branches of Government" to develop long-term remedies,
and the immediate creation of a special temporary panel of
Circuit Judges to hear cases referred to it by the Supreme
Court -- typically cases involving conflicts between the
Courts of Appeals.
It is difficult to develop compelling arguments either for
or against the proposal to create another commission to
study problems of the judiciary. The Freund and Hruska
committees are generally recognized to have made valuable
contributions to the study of our judicial system -- but few
of their recommendations have been adopted.
I suspect that
there has been enough study of judicial problems and possible
remedies, but certainly would not want to oppose a modest
proposal for more study emanating from the Chief Justice.
The more significant afflatus from the Chief Justice is his
proposal for immediate creation of a temporary court between
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court, to decide cases
involving inter-circuit conflicts referred to it by the
Supreme Court. The Chief would appoint 26 circuit judges -two from each circuit -- to sit on the court in panels of
seven or nine.
The Chief estimates that this would relieve
the Supreme Court of 35 to 50 of its roughly 140 cases
argued each term. The Supreme Court would retain certiorari
review of decisions of the new court.
It is not at all clear, however, that the new court would
actually reduce the Court's workload as envisioned by the
Chief. The initial review of cases from the Courts of
Appeals would become more complicated and time-consuming.
Justices would have to decide not simply whether to grant or
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deny certioriari, but whether to grant, deny, or refer to
the new court. Cases on certiorari from the new court would
be an entirely new burden, and a significant one, since
denials of certiorari of decisions from the new court will
be-far more significant as a precedential matter than
denials of cases from the various circuits. The existence
of a new opportunity for review can also be expected to have
the perverse effect of increasing Supreme Court filings:
lawyers who now recognize that they have little chance for
Supreme Court review may file for the opportunity of review
by the new court.
Judge Henry Friendly has argued that any sort of new court
between the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court would
undermine the morale of circuit judges. At a time when low
salaries make it difficult to attract the ablest candidates
for the circuit bench, I do not think this objection should
be lightly dismissed.
Others have argued that conflict in
the circuits is not really a pressing problem, but rather a
healthy means by which the law develops. A new court might
even increase conflict by adding another voice to the
discordant chorus of judicial interpretation, in the course
of resolving precise questions.
The proposal to have the Chief Justice select the members of
the new court is also problematic. While the Chief can be
expected to choose judges generally acceptable to us,
liberal members of Congress, the courts, and the bar are
likely to object.
In addition, as lawyers for the Executive, we should scrupulously guard the President's appointment powers. While the Chief routinely appoints sitting
judges to specialized panels, the new court would be qualitatively different than those panels, and its members would
have significantly greater powers_than regular circuit
judges.
My own view is that creation of a new tier of judicial
review is a terrible idea.
The Supreme Court to a large
extent (and, if mandatory jurisdiction is abolished, as
proposed by the Chief and the Administration, completely)
controls its own workload, in terms of arguments and
opinions. The fault lies with the Justices themselves, who
unnecessarily take too many cases and issue opinions so
confusing that they often do not even resolve the question
presented.
If the Justices truly think they are overworked,
the cure lies close at hand. For example, giving coherence
to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by adopting the "good
faith" standard, and abdicating the role of fourth or fifth
guesser in death penalty cases, would eliminate about a
half-dozen argued cases from the Court's docket each term.
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So long as the Court views itself as ultimately responsible
for governing all aspects of our society, it will,
understandably, be overworked. A new court will not solve
this problem.

